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This parler is a case stndy of three permit renelmls of the Wawoi Gna,,! log­
ging concession in the Westen! Province of PNG. These permit renewals 
invoked a specific conjunction of temlXlral pradices that centered on the 
transitional prO\�sions of PNG's Forestry Act (1991 J. The transitional arrange­
ments provide<1 a way to HsavcM permits th(l\ pre-c)<istoo the 1991 Act and gave 
lOgging companies exemptions from the full application of that Act. I argue 
tll11t the colltinual operation of various transitional provisions over the last 
twenty years has been a major public IXllicy failure. As this case study outlines. 
these prol1sions have facilitated tile production of potential illegalities in tIle 
permit renC\\�11 process amI have helped to restrict the rights and ]>Owers of 
the original resource 0\\1 ers. 
FORESTRY POLITICS IN PNC USUALLY liAS BEEN DEFINED by stories of 
illegality, mismanagement, and dubious forms of reSOltTcc 3cquisition. In 
contrast, this paper emphasizes that PNG's forestty sector is also defined 
by how time is institutionali .... ed as a Ix>litical resource ill forms of regula­
tion. If recent work in policy and resource appropriation often relics on 
spatial metaphors, such as nlultisited or non local ethnography, commodity 
chains, and idcas of IXllic)' as the articulation of social processes sp3tming 
n13n)' locations, this :u1ide outlines a "politics of time" (nut'!. 1992; 
Creenhouse 1996) centered on the role of rules about time-th3t is, rules 
that privilege certain courses of action over others. I Such rules refer "in 
particular, to timing (when something happens): sequence (in what order 
things happen); speed (how fast they happen) und duration (for how long 
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they happen}" (Coetz 2011, 3), They involve the capacity to control the 
allocation of time to actors and to control tile scheduling of events. In this 
paper, the emphasis is 011 rules and practices related to the renewal of 
limber permits. Involved is an arra)' of temporalities-the scheduling of 
reviews and renegotiations of permit conditions; highly specified time spans 
(e,g., the term of the permit, expiry dates), repetitive processes (permit 
renewals every tell ycars), sequence transformations (an expected sequence 
is inverted; c.g., a permit is renewed atld then negotiations about conditions 
lake place), and forms of time restriction (threats to close the operation da 
show cause notices and strikes: attempts to limit the application of transi­
tional arrangements to the permit). These time-based practices are crucial 
forms of power that are also themselves objects of power relations. 
I outline the importance of such practices in forest I)' regulation b�' 
looking at the way negotiations O\'cr permit renewals of the \Vawoi Cua\; 
concession have interacted with legal rilles concerning a specific form of 
temporal ordering-transitional relief (Kaplow 1986),2 The transitional 
relief found in the Forestr), Act (1991) granted logging companies, who 
were engaging in activities that the 1991 Act repealed, an ability to keep 
011 acting as though the new Act did 110t apply to them. The generosity of 
the permitted noncompliance was further enhanced by the fact that the 
ability to act in terms of now repealed laws was not clearly restricted to a 
;<;pcdllc pel'jod of time, It W;L� left ull-sped!kd. 
Given sllch a legal context, over the next twenty years, the relief (>rovl­
siom bl."Came a permanently available mode of action and decision, which 
remained in conniet with existing law, but was not illegal. The beneficiaries 
of such relief-the logging company and the state--enslJred, through 
intense lobbying and often experimental innovation, that it was prescn'ed 
and extended. The associated forms of timing, sequeneing and other forms 
of temporal ordering came to define a forestry-specific temporal culture 
linked to the permit rencwal process. In addition. during rcnewal proc'csscs, 
the amount or timber logged and left standing ror future exploitation (Brack 
2011: Keenan et al. 201 I) also became an issue linked to the possibilities 
of permit renewal ami the application of transitional arrangement. The 
result was the emergence of a set of temporally saturated practices linking 
transitional arrangements to other notions of temporality-such as esti­
mates of "future stock" and ideas about "sustainable" logging practices. 
These conjunctions helped define how permit renewals for \Vawoi Cua\i 
(and other concessions) have taken place over the last thirty years. 
The Wawoi Cuavi case also indicates how the law, and associated policy 
decision-making concerning the concession's futllre, were quite eITecth'cly 
used to limit resource owners' capacity to negotiate new conditions regulat­
ing forest concessions such as \\lawoi Cuavi. The hlw helped maintain 
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exploitative relationships that might otherwise be more clearly problematic 
or c\'en illegal. The paper also outlines how the transitional relief in the 
1991 Act has profoundly limited the capacity to reform PNG's forestry 
sector. Such findings support the already existing Lxxly of work that pres­
ents transition relief as sociall), unproductive policy (Kaplow 1986),3 PNC's 
Forest')' Aet of 1991 emerges as a contradicto,)' Site-although it \\',IS an 
attempt to reform PNC's forestry, it also contained legal mechanisms that 
hm'c pre\'euted reform, 
Altllough highlighting how speci fic lcgal and temporal constmcts helped 
to prevcnt cllstoma,)' landowllers from implementing real meaningful his· 
torical change in their relationships with industrial logging, given the poli­
tics of forestlY regulation in this pari of PNC, outcomes for local resource 
owners lnay not have been that different if the 1991 Forestry Act was fully 
applied to the \Vawoi Guavi concession (without any reliance on transi­
tional provisions of that Act). The stories I tell here, about the conjunction 
of permit negotiations, tTansitional relief. other policies. and power, 
highlight pernlit renewal as a provisional political achievement. Such stories 
can never fully exclude the possibility of alternatives. Although I take 
repetitions of broadly similar regulative processes as indicating the institu­
tionalization of forms of domination, I do so without assuming a simple 
reproduction of sllch corporate-state forms of ordering and accumulation. 
Instead . follOWing Wright (201 I. 30). policy making is presented as an 
emergent effect of elemeots (laws, actors, sub-judicial reviews, legal 
opinions, amendments. etc.) that are assembled and reassembled in each 
set of cvents concerning successive cases of permit renewa1. 
Finally. milch of this paper relies on already existing empirical data avail­
able from court files. vigorous policy debates about pcrmits (200:Y2004 
Be\'iew Team 2004a, b, c, d; Overseas Development Institute 2007) and 
histories of PNC's forestry policy (Filer and Sekhran 1998), Where it 
differs from such material is in the time scale of the coverage offered here 
and in a consequent emphaSiS on the construction of time as a political 
resource, This paper consists largely of a chronology of events associated 
\\;th thrcc permit renewals in 1992, 2002, amI 2012. However. before 
1ll00;ng into this detail, I provide some background to the Wawoi Guavi 
concession by reviewing its place in the region's politics of resource 
acquisition. 
The \Vuwoi GU1H,j COIl(''ession on the Legal Frontier of the 
PNC State 
The Wawoi Cuavi concession located in the IXXlrly developed Western 
Province (see Fig.) has long been a key case study for concerns abollt the 
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FIGURE. Proposed and operational logging concessions in tile 
Western Province (with Wawoi Cuavi highlighted). 
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legalit), of PNC's forestr), sector. One reason for the salience of \Vawoi 
Cu:wi in such representations of PNC's forestry sector was that Rimbunan 
Hijau. the owners of the concession. in conjunction with the stale regulator, 
the PNC Forest Authorit), (PNCFA), actively embedded the Wawoi Cuavi 
concession in potential illegalities. The most spectacular of these decisions 
involved RimbunaTl Hijall. in the mid-l990s, attempting to acquire the vast 
Kamula ))oso concession (some 789,000 ha) as a physical "extension"' of the 
smaller \Vawoi Guavi concession (see Fig.). This extension was granted in 
early 1999 but was subject to intense public scrutiny by the media and by 
PNC's Ombudsman Commission (2002, 2(04). The resulting sense of scan­
dal helped trigger a donor-sponsored review of how forestI'), concessions 
in PNC were conforming 10 the requirements of the 1991 Forestry Act. 
These reviews. supplemented by repcn1s by NCOs, proVided considerable 
e\idence of mismanagement and illegality both in PNC's forestry sector 
generatly and in the W;lwoi Cuavi COllcession (Creenpeace 1002, 2004; 
Australian Conservation Foundation 2(06). 
Himbunan Hijau and its consultants. ITS Clobal (2006a, b) Vigorously 
denied the concerns raised by these reviews. Heports generated by ITS 
highlighted apparent factual errors in the claims of critics like Creenpeaee 
and argued the government was primarily responSible for breaches of legal 
rules. ITS emphasized how logging reduced local poverl), and supplied 
useful infrastructure. The collipany also mobilized landowner support for 
its aclh·ities and, orten sliccessfully, tried to get plaintiffs to withdraw from 
legal cases concenting the \\Iawoi Cuavi concession. Himbunan I-lijau also 
started to use libel law in various countries to prevent publication of claims 
concerning illegalities. Himbunan Hijau also started portraying itself as 
committed to legal and sllstainable forest management in PNG. 
\bny of the reviews and reports created for the benefit of the PNC 
slate were critical of Hirnbunan i-iijau·s opeTiltions. But they lacked any 
substantive power. because alt of them, including reviews by the Ombudsman 
Commission. were sub-judiCial (Tushnel 2002), not binding on govern­
ment. and consequently were largely ignored. The courts seemingly pro­
\ided the only wa), of creating enrorceable findings. And to this end, the 
Emironmental Law Centre launched legal action against \Vawoi GlIav; and 
the PNCFA in 2004 that questioned the legality of the initial transfer of 
forest resources and the legality of subsequent permits. EcoForestry Forum. 
in 2006. initiated a legal challenge to the Kamula Doso extension that. in 
2:010. resulted in an agreement among the parties thai the initial forest 
management agreement (FMA), between the slate and Kamula ))oso's 
forest owners was invalid. During the years it took PNC's legal system to 
reach this decision Kamula Doso {linked to \\lawoi Clla"i via the proposed 
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extension) was a place where propert)' claims. and PNC's forestry law, 
emerged as liminal and lLllc1ear.� 
Penni( Renewals mHI Some Law about TI':msitions between Laws 
The Wawoi Guav; concession was further embedded in legal ambiguity 
attributable to the way the permit regulating the concession was created in 
the 1980s and extended in 1992, 2002, and 2012. These extensions relied 
significantl), on Section 137 (and relevant arncnclmclIls) of the 1991 Forestry 
Act. Section 137 saved permits that were already created under Acts 
existing prior to the 1991 Act. Part of Section 137 slated all: 
Permits . limber rights purchase agreements granted uncler the 
Forestry Act (Chapter 216) (repealed); ... that arc valid und ill 
force immediately before the coming into operation of this Act. 
shall continue, on that coming into operation, to have full force 
and efTeet for tile term for which they were granted or entered 
into or llntil they sooner expire or are revoked according to law as 
if the Aet under which they were granted or entered into had not 
been repealed. 
That all three permit renewals relied on various transitional arrangements, 
highlights an extraordinary persistence of the original Wawoi Gua\-; permit 
for over twenty years after the repeal of that permit's original authorizing 
legislation. Such persistence is a spcciflc political (I<:coillplislllllent­
transforming a globally common form of organizing a legal transition into 
a speciflc organiz.1.tion of temporality that prevented a flill transition to the 
llew legal order. Although transitional arrangements in other jurisdictions 
can define a limited period of time within which any discrepancies between 
two possibly inconsistent laws could be resolved. no sllch period was defini­
ti\'ely specified in the Forestry Act. The Act indicated transitional relief for 
one term of the permit. but it did not explicitly rule oul further extensions 
of this saved or grandfathered permit. 
Saving the New 1992 Consolidated Pel,,,it 
Permit conditions have alw3),s been somewhat problematic features in the 
history of the \\'awoi Gua"; concession. Originally the Wawoi Cua\'; conces­
sion consisted of one block to which another was added in a manner that 
was found to be illegal (Barnett 1 989a, b). Then in 1986. well prior to 
Rimbunan Hijau's involvement with Wawoi Guavi. Mr. Diro. then Minister 
of Forests. promised a third block (Block 3) to the operator, Straits (PNG). 
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\\;thout imposing any new infrastructure conditions on the operating com­
pany. This was done before there had been any purchase of the timber 
rights by the state (Barnett 1989, 19). It was not until June 26. 1989. that 
a timber rights purchase (THP) agreement was actually signed between the 
state and various resource owners associated with Block 3. By this time, 
Himbunan Hijau had acquired the concession. and on September 15, 1989, 
the Secretary of the Departmellt of Forests granted a six-month timber 
license for Block 3. to Niugini Lumber, a subsidiary of Himbunan I-lijau. 
This history of Block 3. in addition to many other administrative difficulties 
(Wood I 996a), gave the Wawoi Cuavi concession a certain notoriety in 
polic),-making circles. 
This notoriety W:LS compounded when, in 1990, Niugini Lumber applied 
for the three Wawoi Clla"i blocks to be consolidated into a single permit. 
This consolidated permit was granted by then Minister of Forests Jack 
Ceni:. 011 April 10, 1992. just days before the new Forestry Act (1991) came 
into force and despite there being a moratorium on issuing new timber 
permits (Filer and Sekhran 1998: 145-152). However, because this consoli­
dated permit predated the 1991 law, it was subject to the transitional sec­
tions of the new Act that saved such permits pending them being brought 
into conformity with tilat Act. The transitional arrangements meant that 
\Vawoi Cllavi could L'Ontinue to operate for a further ten years under the 
older, b), then suspended, forestry acl that authorized the initial contract 
between the state and the developer. 
The \Vawoi Guavi permit renewal was pari of bundle of between ten 
and nineteen permits the government wished to renew prior to the 1991 
Act being gazetted. This msh of permit renewals indicated a desire by the 
logging comp.1.nies to capture the bencflts of the transitional relief. The)' 
were rcl)'ing on the transition:.1 SectiOllS of the new Act to avoid the risk 
that it might require such concessions be put to competitive tender under 
an FMA signed by representatives of incolvoratcd land groups (ILCs). The 
registration of the ILGs W:LS a quite difficult· and expensive process and h:.d 
the potential to destabilize the company's st rategy of using landowner com· 
panics and their executives as sources of political support. In addition, the 
new Act contained provision for a seriolls consideration of the region's 
development options prior to signing of an FMA. and an environmental 
impact statement had to be undertaken. The ,\ct was intended to shift the 
forestry sector toward ensuring tile continuous production of export logs 
and sawn timber via the rational planning of sustainable yield management 
with an emphaSiS 011 a long-term cutting cycle of forty years (National 
Forest Pian cited in Keenan et al 2011, 178). Unfortunately management 
technologies :\Ssoci:.ted \vith sllstainable logging were never stabilized into 
routine social relationships or agreed narrati\'cs about a sustainable future. 
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Indeed by e.xtending its permit vi" the transitional :lrrangements 
Rimbullall I-lij:lu largely defeated the purpose of the reform process. In 
addition. the substantive conditions of the saved consolidated permit were 
drafted in a way that meant Himbunan Hijau was not really enc:umbered 
with specific obligations: 
Section 4.5 The Permit Holder shall assist ill the Ilmr;isilm of sawn 
timber, machinery works and other construction materials for the 
establishment! construction of the follOWing facilities: 1) Churth, 
2) Community l'lall, 3) Aid Post, 4) Classrooms, 5) Teachers' 
Houses, 6) (\ccomll odatio!l for Aid Post Personnel, 7) Improvement! 
Upgrading of existing airstrip. 8) Sport's playing fields including 
hasketball court. .. .The follOWing Villages will be the beneficiaries 
of the above facilities under clause 4.5. 1 Kopalasi 2 !\'Iusula 
3 Kasigi" Haivaro 5 Pariemc 6 Diwamc 7 Kubcai. (Wood 1996b; 
my emphasiS). 
Kinhill Kramer (1997) calculated actual expenditure on these infrastnLcture 
benefits involved only around KO.19 per cubic meter. Other financial 
benefits involved: 
I. The standard royalt)' payment paid at the rate of K JO per cubic 
meter. 
2. A reforestation levy of KO .. 50 per cubic meter payable to the PNG 
Forestry Authority (KPiVIG 1997. I: National Forest Service 1998). 
but landowners did not receive any bellefit from this levy. 
3. A log export premium of K 1.00 per cubic meIer paid 10 Wawoi 
Guavi Development (WGD) PI)' Ltd. a landowner company (KP�'IG 
1997, I; National Forest Service 1998). 
,I. An adclitional log export premiulll of KO.75 pcr cubic meier payable 
to five landowner groups, which operated under WGD (KPMG 1997, 
I; National Forest Service 1998). 
These kind of arrangemcnts generated complaints from landowners. As 
early as 1993. Kasua people living primarily at Weliyo and Musula \\ith 
some support from Kamula landowners at Kasigi had formed their own 
representative landowner company-Kasua Development. They made it 
clear that they hoped to change the terms and conditions operating in the 
l3loc·k 3 area. They sought to increase the basic royalty for non-prcmium 
hardwoods from K3.20 to K20 per cubic meter and wanted a 50 percent 
share of the operator's profits. Also. they asked that the landowners sce and 
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study a copy of the agreement between the operator and the landowners 
before the), signed it. In December 1993, another group of Block 3 land­
owners associated with the Bua landowner (;ompany launched an injunction 
against Niugini Lumber preventing an)' further work in Block 3. Those 
launching the iujunetion argued thaI. although their members did sign the 
original contract with the state that sold their timber rights to the state, 
they did so believing that the document would bring "development"' to the 
area without knowing it was a TnI' agreement. The)' sought to have the 
TRP agreement and associated permit deciar(.-'(i void. However, by May 12, 
1994, tile Bua group discolltinued this action partly on tile grounds that tile 
court could find nothing to injunct because. at that time, no logging was 
occurring in Block 3 and partl), because thcre was some dissension among 
the landowners over whether they should pursue the aeHol!. 
As well as seeking an injunction on operations in Block 3 landowners 
requested that the PNGFA issue a show-cause letter to close down the 
operation at \Vawoi Guavi. III  Jnnuary 1995, foresters from the Southern 
Regional Office investigated the landowners· concerns. Although they 
confirmed man)' of landowners concerns, they found other landowners, 
from Block I and 2, did not support the closure of operations, In addition, 
sections of government did not endorse the show-cause option. Jean 
Kekedo, then Managing Director of the PNCFA. ;lchised the acting 
�linister of Forests, Titus Philemon, on 1\'la)' 16, 1995, that the PNCFA 
should not authorizc closure evcn though: 
there are enough violations 10 Permit Conditions for the issuance 
of a show cause letter. I havc asked for a show cause letter to be 
drafted for Illy signature .. . , Mr. Dolman had advised me that if 
1 take the Show Cause Option 1 \\i1l end up haVing to suspend the 
project and the country . .  cannot afTord suspending projects 
during Ihis difficult financial situation the PNC GO\'emlllent faces. 
We still have to find a compromise (Wood 1996b). 
Also. innuencing the PNGFA·s ability to initiate a major review of the 
permit were understandings of the terms of the permit. The 200312004 
He\'icw Team, during its investigations of the \Vawoi Guavi concession, 
came across a file note that stated: 
Attempts around 1998-2000 to review the W-G Timber Permit 
never got ofT the ground because H H refused to coopemtc-a 
loophole had been placed into the TP which only required a 5 
yearly review of the forest working plan bllt not the TP (200312004 
He\iew Team 2004a. 2). 
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As a resuit, no major review of the permit conditions took place. There was 
no real attempt to ensure the permit's terms and conditions conformed 
to the 1991 Act. The existing permit and. 10 an ambiguously limited extent, 
the 1991 Forestry Act continued to be the anI), contractual regulators 
of the landowner's interests in the \\'awoi Cl.luvi concession. According to 
one set of reviewers, the landowners had no formally speCified substantive 
rights ill the Wawoi Guavi Jlmject beyond the permit: 
[Tlhe \\lawoi-Gua"i landowners do not feature in any of the legal 
documents or formalities applying to the initial gnlllt of the operat­
ing right for this project. This is an extremely disturbing situa­
tion .... In the absence of 11 proper project agreement tho Timber 
Permit is the only oper:lting document for the project. The land­
owners have openly expressed dissatisfaction of the performance 
of the Permit holder and called for the review of the timber 
permit. ... There is no substantive aspect of this project that gives 
any recognition to the rights of thc landowners. Thoy are entirely 
at the merc)' of Rimbunan Hijau, which holds all legal rights relat­
ing to the project and to the timber resource (Independent Forestry 
Review Team 2003:4-5). 
The crucial element was the exclusion of landowners from any formal role 
in negotiations concerning permit renewal. The next parts of this essay 
show that this exclusion was reinforced by the use of transitional clauses to 
further preempt any real participation by landowners in rc\'iewing the 
permit and renegotiating its tenus and conditions. In 2002-04, and again 
in 20]2, this involved transforming the usual sequcnce of c'·cnts where 
negotiations would be !ol1owed b)' permit renewal to a sequence invoh'ing 
permit renewal followed by uegotiations. 
Renewing the TRP Permit in 2002 
On September 12, 200], Himbunan Hijau applied for a rcnewal without 
offering any new (."Onditions r"vorable to the landowners. Indeed, it was not 
until Ma)' 2004-well after the landowners bad lost allY negotiating power 
because the permit had already been renewed-that certain new landowner 
benefits were inco'lJOratecl into the permit. During the negotiations some 
landowners argued no extension of the permit should be allowed until ··a 
more appropriate legal arrangement was flnall), negotiated·· (Independent 
Forestry Hcview Team 2003,5). These views were m:pressed in a briefing 
paper prepared for the Forestry Board when it was considering the \\'awoi 
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Guavi permit extension. Also, the paper noted the landowners intended to 
shut down the operations sllould negotiations be unsatisfactorily concluded. 
Also included was recommendation from forestry officers that no more 
than a six-month extension be granted. 
However. the Minutes of the Forestry Board held on January 30. 2002. 
show l>.'Ir. Nen, the Managing Director of the PNGFA. withdrew this paper 
and that it was never presented to the Board. On February 1 . 2002. Mr. 
:-.icn signed an extension to the \Vawoi GU:l\'i permit. He exercised what 
he pur ported to be a delegated power to recommend the grant of the 
extension to the �·tinister on behalf of the board (Independent Forestry 
Re\iew Team 2003, 17). ,\1though claims by senior bureaucrats or the 
\'\inister to usc a delegated power of the board have a long history (see 
Filer and Sekhran 1995. l61), there is little evidence of explicit delegation 
by the Board on the matter of the extension of the Wawoi Guavi permit. 
The absence of any explicit delegation was overcome by a series of admin­
istrath'e memos that asserted its existence. On February I ,  2002, a paper 
Signed by the General Manager of the PNCFA, supported the exercise of 
the �'lanagillg Director's delegated power (Independent Forestry Redew 
Team 2003, IS), In addition Mr. Nen drafted a Brief for the Minister of 
Forests explaining how he had exercised "a delegated power" on behalf of 
the board (Independent Forestry Ileview Team ZOO3, IS). On February 4, 
1001, Forest Minister Ogio signed an extension of ten years to the Wawoi 
Cua\; permit \\�thout any new conditions being added to the permit 
(Independent Forestry Heview Team 20 3, IS), 
From Himbunan Hijau's perspective, the process had been extremely 
efficient-they gained their permit renewal without making any conces­
sions and had only formally applied for a renewal four and half months 
earlier (in September loo!). The extension carne under criticism from the 
World Bank that found that "serious questions" had arisen about the pro­
cessing of the :Ipplication and that some steps were "irregular" amI failed 
to follow due process. Mr. Nen was asked to explain his actions in claiming 
the delegated power. which had efTectively excluded the board from any 
role in the process. The team reviewing existillg forestr), concessions ques­
tioned the legalit), of the procedure. They argued the polic)' ··intentiou" 
motivating the Act was to ensure that "timber permits issued under the 
preceding Acts, if not brougllt into line \\�tll the 1991 Act would be allowed 
to continue to their date of expiry on I)''' (20 312004 Heview Team 2004a. 
6). Concessions subject to transitional procedures would be restructured to 
comply with the new Forest!)' Act prior to tllCir permit's expiry date. If this 
did not happen, the permit should be left to expire without an)' extension 
of the term of the permit (200312004 Beview Team l004d. 1). Logging 
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should cease if there W�L� failure to fully conform to the 1991 Act. It 
followed thai: 
there was no legal basis for the r\'lanaging Director to recommend, 
or the Minister to grant, the extension in February 2002. 
Consequently the current ongoing logging operations under TP 
1�7 Wawoi Cuavi also have no legal basis (200312004 Review Team 
2004d,6). 
The reviewers, citing a government legal opinion. also argued that. 
[i1f it had been intended that the authorities and permits under 
the old Act should be treated as "timber authorities" and "timber 
permits" under the new Act, the appropriate provision would have 
been a provision deeming authorities under the old Aet to be 
"limber authorities" [and timber permits] under the new Act 
(200312004 Review Team 2004d, I) .  
But countering these kinds of arguments, in July and November 2003, the 
Prime Minister's office received legal opinions that confirmed the right to 
extend savccl l)Crmits under the transitional provisions of the 1991 Forestry 
Act. These opinions argued any logging contract "written prior to the 
implementation of the Forestry Act 1991 would bind the PNC Forest 
Authority" (B. Brunton, memorandum of advice, regarding the Forestry 
Act ss78,132,143, unpubl., 2004, 10). 
The World Bank called for renegotiations of the Wawoi C\Ja\'; permit 
and indicated that failure to achieve new conditions could result in a 
suspension of operations. Howcver, the National Executive Council (;-.i EC), 
PNC's cabinet. ignored these demands, and on June 6. 200.3, it directed 
the PNGFA to implement "the revised timber permit conditions as negoti� 
ated" (ZOO:YZ004 Heview Team Z004e, 7) even though this new permit did 
not change the allowable cut nor did it Significantly improve landowner 
benefits. In doing this, the NEC was prepared to disregard the conditions 
of a recent World Bank loan linked to a forest conservation project (FCP) 
worth some SUSl7 million. By Augus1 2003. the World Bank had listed t.he 
"'awoi Cliavi case as a breach of this loan agrcemcnt because the govem­
ment had failed to ensure the concessions compliance with the Forestry 
Act (200312004 Hevicw Team 2oo4c, 9). 
For a brief time. it appeared the World Bank application of pressure 
had some influence 011 the PNCFA. On August 1, 2003, Mr. Nelson, the 
Managing Director of PNCFA, "ordered the immediate suspension of 
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logging operations in Vailala and ordered that the permit for Wawoi 
Cuad be suspended" (The No/iII/wI August 20, 2003). The next day, 
because of other matters. the Forest Minister dismissed 1\h. Nelson 
from office. The new Forest Minister then asked the PNCFA " to review" 
the decision to suspend the permits for the Vailala and \\'awoi Cua\'i 
concessions (,file Nl/tiO/J(l1 August 18. :2003). 
t\t the same time President of the Forest Industries Association, 
responded to the World Bank (and other reformers of PNC's forestry 
sector) by accllsing them of acting "outside the law." He asked: 
why have they ignored a National E.Xt."'<."unve Council directive. 
b}llassed the legal authority entrenched by government in the 
National Forest Board. and chosen to force the now suspellCled 
managing director of the National Forest Service to issue these 
notices? . .  The World Bank is trying to hully this country and the 
timber industry by acting in a hea\)' handed a1l(1 racist manner . . . .  
The World Bank is doillg this because they are confident they are 
above the law ill PNC (1'he N{/Iimwl. August 18. 2003). 
What the World Bank wanted was e\'idence thai the Wawoi Gila,,; permit 
had been broughl into compliance wilh Ihe operation wilh Ihe Forestry 
ACI. t\s a way of indicating its displeasure at events concerning \Vawoi 
Cua"i, and olher concessions, the "'orld Bank then threatened to withdraw 
complelely form PNG (Post Cmllier September 4, 2003) but then decided 
only to suspend the Fep \\'orlh somc $US17 million (The NoliO/wl 
September I .  2003). Because the government did not support this project. 
its suspension was not a \'ery cffective tool for ensming compliance on 
matters like the renegotiation of the \\lawai Cua"i permit (Filer, Dubash. 
and Kalil 2000; Filer 2004). What was made clear during this time was the 
World Bank's limited ability to seriously inlluence PNC's forest policy and 
e\'cnts concemiug \Vawoi Cuavi. 
Further attempts to iulluence ucgotiatious over permit conditions wcre 
countered by Himbu!lau I-l ijau's argumeut that the negotiations were 
already concluded (200312004 Review Team :2004c, 12). In January 2.004, 
the \,,"orld Bank again requestcd that the \\Iawoi Glla\; timber project be 
suspendcd because of the lack of progress amending the Timber Pcrmit 
(200312004 Review Team 2004c. 12). This had some support from sections 
of the govemment becaL;se a letter by the PNCFA to the Managing Director 
of \Vawoi Gua\'i noted that "if we rail 10 reach agreement by 15 February 
2004 then the Covemment will take steps to suspend the permit" (200.'312004 
He\iew Team 2004c, 13). HimbuJ1an Hijau replied on February 5, arguing 
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that, at a meeting with the World Bank and the Chief Secretary, it had 
been agreed to allow morc lime to conclude negotiations. Moreover. the 
parties had agreed " '0 revisit certain conditions of the timber permit with­
out wah1ug the legal right of the timber permit holder thaI the negotiations 
has been duly concluded" (200312004 Hevicw Team 2004c, 13) These 
negotiations between Himbunan Hijau and the PNCFA were completed on 
April 30, 2004, \\�th landowners' participation being confined to oosen'cr 
status. 
In the review team's opinion. the resulting agreement to Amend Timber 
Permit 1-7 represented Lhe complete faHure by the PNGFA to impose an�' 
new conditions on the company. The " agreed changes" did not require land 
group incorporation ami the implemcntation of a dc\'clopment options 
study; there was to be no advertisement of the project for tender. and the 
changes to the allowable ellt did not achieve "anything like sustainability" 
(Independent Forcst Bevicw Team 2oo4c, 8). The), concluded. "at no time 
since the Minister granted an extension to the term ofTP 1-7 \\lawoi Gua'; 
in February 2002 have the terms and conditions of TP 1-7 Wawoi Cuad 
been in compliance with the ForestlY Act 1991" (200.'312004 Heview Team 
2004:1, i). 
Despite these flndings the Heview Team, like Jeall Kekedo pre\;ollsly, 
also equivocated about moving to shut down the opel":1tioll. The Be\;cw 
Team IIsed arguments about the unsustainable exploitation of the timher 
resources to justify an economic argument against bringing the TBP-hased 
pcrmit into conformit), with the law or signiflcantl)' improving beneflts 
nowing to resource owners. This VlCW renected a persisting conventional 
wisdom in forest policy circles that illvenlory estimates were unreliable 
with concessions that were iutended to last thirty-flve to forty years often 
only lasted ten to flfteen years (Keenan et a1. 2011. 178). These ideas 
emerged in the Review Teams' discussions about the 2002 renewal of the 
\ \lawoi Guav; permit. Taking a pragmatiC view, t hcse advisors argued " given 
the limited nature of the remaining forest resource it is qllestioned whether 
in the case ofTI' 1-7 Wawoi Clla"i compliance with the Act is realistiC, or 
indeed economically or sociall), desirablc" (2003.12004 Heview Team 2oo4a. 
0. They suggcsted resources would be fairl), qUickl), exhausted: 
Toda)'. in 200314. after about 10 ),ears of logging at the permitted 
unsustainable rate, it is generally impractical to consider restruc­
turing all)' remaining projects set lip under the legislation preced­
ing the J�orestr)' Act 1991 in order that the), might bettcr compl)' 
with the National Forest Policy 1991 and the Forestry Act 1991. 
Only remnant resources remain, ami essentially the opportunity to 
restnlcture projects has passed. (200312004 Review Team 2004a. 2) 
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Despite this crisis lIarrative of o\'crcxploitatioll and limited remnant 
resources, the \\lawai Guavi concession went on to produce timber for the 
Ilex! ten years. 
One result of these debates over permit extensions was a 200.5 amend­
Illent to the Forestry Act that deleted a part of section 137 (cited above) 
that allowed permits to persist if the), were granted before the new Forestry 
Aet came into force. The deleted words stated permits and timber rights 
purchase agrcements could function "as if the Act under which Ihc)' wcre 
granted or entered into had not been repealed. "  The amendments stated 
that timber permits linked to THPs collid be extended subject to the 
developer being acceptable to the customary owners and having engaged 
in "satisfactory performance" of the logging operation. In addition to some 
other ('onditiolls, such as payment of performance bond, amendments to 
the permit conditions could also be made such as including il "timetable 
for the delivery of infrastmcture and other community based develop­
ments" (Section 31 (b) (J  B) 200.5 Forest Amendment Act). A further Sl."C­
lion of the 200.5 Amendment Act stated that all permits previollsly saved 
under the previous version of the Forestry Act "are deemed to be extended 
under this section" (Section 31  (b) (I  Fl). This was an attempt to fully 
legalize all extensions of saved permits, including the \\lawoi Cuavi permit. 
In a 1.006 story nlll by the Post-Courier. Himbllnan Hijau indicated it 
thought the amendments had achieved precisely the required legalit),: 
In  August 2005, the Parliament made a legislative clarification to 
stop this media speculation on legality . . .  [vial Section 31  which 
amends Section 137 of the Forestry Act 1991 and the relevant 
amendment Section 31 (h) ( I  F). Himbunan Hijau said it could not 
understand why "all these learned writers" failed to highlight the 
ahove mentioned provision of the Aet which puts to rest all this 
futile discourse 011 illegality (l'oSI Corlliel'. May 5, 2(06). 
Another result of the arguments over the 2002 permit renewal was that 
Rilllbunan I-I ijau, in conjunction with sections of the state. had managed to 
defeat the intentions of the review, the \Vorld Bank, and supporting donors, 
slLeh as Australia, on this issue, The), had intensified their power at the 
expense of the \\Iorld Bank. the Ombudsman Commission, donors. and 
�COs who attempted to intervene in the 2002--04 permit renewal process. 
They were able to maintain the autonolllY of their style of decision making. 
In  effect, sections of the forest policy, elite of PNC, and Himbunan J-lijau, 
succeeded ill rendering themselves less <lCl.'Ountablc to PNC citizens, legal 
institutions like the Ombudsman, and intemational illstitutiolls like the 
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World Bank. Heform, lLsing sub-judicial review and the limited leverage of 
the \Vorld Bank and other donor.�, were demonstrable failures. There was 
no rcal power to replace one form of social organization-a rorestry sector 
embedded in forms of legally questiouable ami mismanaged decision 
making-with another associated with " good governance," transparency. 
and fully legal decision making.s 
umdowncr Financial Benefits 
And what was the effect of all thi.� forest poliey debate Oil the local land­
owners of the \Vawoi Gum'i concession? One indicator is to consider finan­
cial bctlcflt's to the blldowncrs. Some relevant data are outlined in Table 1 
that shows some of the aggregate financial outcomes of the \Vawoi Gumi 
concession over thirteen years (1993 to 2005 inclusive). 
In conjuJlction with roads, some company-run stores and health clinics 
and some provision of schoolrooms, the totals for wages, premiums, royal­
ties, and infrastructuTC represent robust estimates of most of major "bene­
fits" from logging in \\Iawoi Gllavi. Looking first at wages the �\iluballli, who 
own most of the core area of the \Vawoi Gllavi concession. lend to recei\'c 
comparatively little income froill working in the concession simply because 
they do not \\lork. From a survey undel'taken in 2010. whereas around 20 
percent of all immigrants at Kanmsi worked. only 5 percent of the Mubami 
landowners did so. �'lllbami resource owners were highly dependent on 
ro)'alties and premiulll payments as a source of money. 
However, as result of the 2002-04 permit, 1I1ld the earlier establishment 
of landowncr companies funded by premiulIls, some landowners ha\'e 
benefited from gaining greater control over cash. The main impro\'cmenl 
for the landowners in the 2002-04 permit was an increase in the premium 
royalty from K4 to KG per cubic meter from exported logs cut ,m)'where in 
the concession over the a three-month period. This royalty was then split 
among six different landowner companies such that effectively each land­
owner comp.my wOlild receive K I for every cubic meter of limber logged 
from anywhere in the concession. Premiums werc effectively controlled by 
T,\BLE 1 .  \Vuwoi Cuavi: Key Financial Benefits 1993-2005 in Millions 
of Kina (ITS Clob'll 2006c, 40). 
Sabry and Ta.\es 
National E�vatriatcs Premiums Esport Infra· 
"'ages Nationals and 1.A.'vies I\orah)' Duty stnlcture Total 
Total 46.19 18.26 17.1 33.91 147.3 2.95 :265.8 
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the executive or the landowner contpany who were authorized to sign ror 
any use or the aCL'Olmts' monies. Those with signing authority tended to be 
the chairman and vice chairman or the landowner company. Withdrawals 
took the rorm or direct cash advances, purchase orders ror goods and ruel 
rrom company stores in Kamusi, regular fixed deductions to pay off debts 
to moneylenders, and cash payments to supporters or the chairman. The 
chairman could also use premium monies to respond to ad hoc requests 
ror runds such as helping with medical emergencies, school rees, costs or 
tertiary education, car repairs. and other expenses. The distribution or pre­
mium royalties throughout the concession area. although involving rela­
tkely small amounts of money. helped to deal with the company"s political 
problem or how to maintain the landowner's political sUPIXlrt during the 
project's entire lire. Premium distributed through local landowner compa­
nies ensured that access to some minor cash benefits would regularly occur 
throughout the concession even in those areas recently logged. which c.'Ould 
not otherwise expect any royalties. or well-maintained roads. ror many 
years. In addition to premiums. during the period 2002-12 landowners 
were also paid royalties on logs at K 10 per cubic meter up (but after 2010, 
some species or timber attracted K20 and K35 per cubic meter). These 
royalties were set nationally and, unlike premiums, were not negotiated 
during the permit renewal process. Quarterly royalties at Kamusi in 
2010-12 sometimes amounted to just over K t million. 
Overall the figures indicat'e historically unprecedented monetary wenltll 
for the Mubami and other landowners, whereas also indicating the state 
extracted more wealth from the region than was received by landowners as 
royalties and premiunls. The table also reinrorces Kinhill Kramer's (1997) 
earlier findings concerning the low level of expenditure on infrastructure 
de\'e!opmenls within the \\lawoi GlIavi (.'Oncession. Because the govern­
ment has itself funded rew specific de\'elopment projects ill the logging 
concession, the figures suggest that, overall. little "inrrastructure" develop­
ment occurred. This outcome was partly the result of the way permit 
conditions were negotiated. 
2012 Unfinished Negotiations of tile Pennil :md Some Rel)etitions 
Because the permit was due to expire in 2012, the landowners spent 
considerable energy in 201 L and early 2012. establishing a consensus on 
key points to be negotiated. 13)' late January 2012, a review committee had 
been selected and a series or public meetings established the key concems 
of landowners. In the 2012 negotiations on the permit's renewal. the land­
owner's primar)' concern was to ensure greater access to premium royalties 
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as :\ precondition to any renewal. This emphasis on premiums was p3rt!), 
attributable to the fact that standard royalties, set for all concessions by the 
PNCFA, were not the subject of these permit renewal negotiations. 
However, the emphasis on premiums also reflected a desire to have control 
over a continuous flow of funds as opposed to the spectacular boom and 
bust of royalt), paymcuts. Landowners decided to argue for an increase in 
the premium royalty from KG pcr cubic meter to K30 per cubic meier. In 
addition, they wanted to increase the number of landowner companies 
from six to around thirty-two. By proliferating the number of landowner 
companies. and increasing the amount of premium paid, they wanted to 
ensure access to premium-derived cash was more eqUitably distributed 
than under the current arrangements, which ravors the executi\"e or only 
s i>; landowner companies. 
Preparation for the 2012 review process also heightened awareness 
or how rew or the 2002 permit conditions had becn fllJrillcd. As with the 
earlier permit, sections or the 2002 permit were written in slich a way as 
to be difficult to enrorce. Clause 7.4 slated " in the event that the Permit 
1·lolder rails to construct or complete a road within the period specified 
above the Permit Holeler shall be given an opportunity to explain the rea­
sons ror the delay in writing and shall be given a rurther rf'asonable exten­
sion or time to complete proVided the extension docs not exceed the permit 
period" (PNC Forest AuthOrity and Wawoi Cuavi Timber Corporation 
2004, 6). Despite their experience of poor road construction and mainte­
nance during the period 2002-11,  in one of their 201:2. position papers, the 
landowners enthUSiastically specified, in great detail, which roads would be 
sealed and would require bridges and culvcrts constrllcted in iron. 
Other permit conditions remained unrulfllled. During the 2002-12 
period the Kanmsi health center was supposed to be supplied high-quality 
hOUSing, a stand-by generator. a patient trolley. and an ambulance. H owcver. 
landowners argued Iklt lIone of these had been delivered, and there was 
failure to complete a program of classroom construction in a number or 
Villages within the Tn» area. 
Landowncrs wcre also interested ill securing COlltrol ovcr mOllies linked 
to other benefits associated with the \\Iawoi Cuavi concession. In 11 letter 
(r..hy 8, 2012) rrom Wawoi Cliavi landowners to the operations manager or 
the Wawoi Guavi concession, the), asked that the "Inrrastructure [levyJ. 
nerorestation Lev)" Log Exrx>rt Development Lev)'. T:L>; rebate Ic\y to be 
reviewed and backdated ('0 the date or commencement of the logging 
operations in TPI-7 area." Landowners also noted the lack or expenditure 
of monies derived from these levies even though funds were apparently in 
trust fund accounts established by the PNCFA. They wanted greater access 
to these levies. 
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By March 2012. it became apparent that these and other permit-related 
issues would not be negotiated by the time the permit expired in late April 
2012. On April 27-tllree days berore tile permit was to expire-Himblllllul 
Hijau wrote to the PNCFA requesting a grace period to contillue operation 
pendillg the renewal or the permit. The next day, the acting managing 
director or the PNCFA responded "I have considered your request as 
genuine and thereby grant an indcl'inite grace period ror your operation to 
continue until such time TPI-7 is extended" (Letter to Himbunan I -lijau 
April 28, 2012). 
The part or Section 137 of the Forestry Act (1991) that discusses grace 
periods was the result of a 1993 amendment to that Act. The amendment 
was passed during a time when the forestry industry believed it would be 
subject to decisions by the Forestry Board to amend any forest concession's 
permit such that it flllly conformed to the new Act. There were conccms 
that there would be no right to appeal such decisions (Filer and Sekhran 
1998:201-02). The amendmellt stated: 
In order to achicve the intention of this Act that . . .  permits . . .  
savcd by this section are able to he adapted to conform to the 
provisions of this Act. the BoaId lila), grant in respect of an)' . , . 
permit . . .  a grace period during which-(a) the provisions of this 
Act shall not apply; and (b) the provisions of the repealed Act 
under which the . .  permit . . .  was granted or the agreement or 
timber purchase agreement was entered into shall apply. 
That the grace period only applies to permits subject to transitional arrange­
ments and renects the generosity of these provisions. Also, as indicated in 
�'Ir. Amos·s letter. after the grace period expired. the Wa\voi Cuavi permit 
could be treated. yet again. ,LS an "extension·· of its original derivation from 
a TRP. The resulting permit would still not be brought into full conformity 
to the existing Forestry Act. 
In granting the grace period. the actillg managing director in 2012 may 
h1l\'e been relying on notion of delegated power to act on behalf of the 
Forestr), Board (similar to that asserted b)' Mr. Nell in the 2002--04 permit 
negotiations). The Act specifies that only the Forestry Board could grant 
such a grace period. Although the acting managing director·s letter docs 
not explicitly address this issue. because he responded within twenty-four 
hours of receiving the request. it seems likely the Board did not have time 
to consider the matter. 
The granting of the indefinite grace period angered landowners. There 
was talk among landowllers and workers that lhe grace period would last 
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until 2018 or 2016 when the timber resources or the concession would be 
exhausted. In this view, the permit would not be significantly renegotiated, 
and unintentionally repeating the rhetoric or the Independent Reviewers 
ill 2004, there were suggestions so liUle timber was lert that the landowners 
had virtually no rcsources lert to pay ror new terms and conditions 
including rull conrormity to the 1991 Act. 
Landowncl' Optimism in thc Promise of Rcview 
The result was a weakening of the landowner's power. According to one 
landowner, the process was a like a rorm or dispossession where the land­
owner's agency was reduced rrom active participation to mere spectator. 
ship. The self-evident unrairness or the PNCFA issuing the graee period 
during negotiations W,IS illegal and corrupt: 
[\V]hell the developer asked for the grace period withollt hesita� 
tions it was very quickly given to the company . Ir he I the manag­
ing director] has done that, our conccrn was thc), should have 
consulted us too. There is not C\'en rairness in there. Ir )'011 can be 
fair I to the logging company] . . .  you must also be fair to us. There 
is corruption going on. Fishy dealings like that. You seem to be 
one sided only, I am like a spectator in my OWII land while both of 
you are playing football. That should not be on . . . .  If rOll ha\'e 
granted that grace period what have rOil done to our timber permit 
conditions? That is not fair. You are [only] giving them grace 
period. \Vllat about the ten years we have corne? \Vhat have you 
implemented for liS? . .  '1'01.1 are granting Ihel'n permission illegally 
rrom our OWII perspective (Terencc Senewa, Interview, �by 2012) 
On :\'Ia)' 8, 2012, the landowners responded throtlgh tlleir lawyer by threat­
ening to " stop all logging operations in TP 1�7 area as or Friday I I  of ;\b�' 
2012." Thcir lawyer argued that because the permit had expired. all logging 
was illegal alld should ccase. Also, he asserted that the managing director 
did not have the power to grant a grace period but did not directly refer 
to the sectiOn of the Act where that power is allocated to the board. 
On this day, the company rf'sponded by a counter strike of its own. It 
shut dOWll all company stores and the medical center; it stood down all 
workers and began discussions with migrant workers about sending them 
back to their provinces. This shocked many of the landowners and other 
residents at KamllSi. By Monday, the medical center had reopened, and the 
store started operating on restricted hours. It soon emerged that what the 
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landowners demanded was tlot a cessation of all operations. Bather they 
wanted to only prevent the feJlillg of trees. They were 1I0t interested in 
shutting down the entire operation at this pOint in the ncgotiations. 
The intention of the strike was to forcc the parties (the state and the 
company) to negotiate a ncw permit agreement with them. and many land­
owners renK1ined committed to a negotiated settlement despite the fact 
that they had been stripped of any Significant bargaining power, This com­
mitment was sometimes based on the idea evident in Terrcnce Senewa's 
account (outlined both above and below). III his view, the landowners' case 
was self-evident to anyone who understood the documented facts and had 
compassion for the landowners. Also evident in his discussion is a limited 
somewhat messianic hope for justice through the obviolls capacities of the 
landowners' lawyer and his documents: 
It looks like we are going to ha\'c a review. Still have a review, The 
de\'eloper is already lelling us they are in a pOSition to have a 
review. So m:m)' things have been mentioncd in the public forum 
that we had I think that the state and the developer are aware 
that there is a mistake. There are so many things that are nol 
done properly they already realize . . . .  I hope this review is going 
to be . . .  tougher than the other previolls review. Our lawyer 7 too 
was invited to be present. He was there yesterday later in the day 
they rang him and invited him to the meeting [in Pori Moresby[. 
Out come you are going to see it today in the document lsent 
by the l:lwyer to clients at Kamusi]. So we were 11 bit impressed 
(interview Terrence Senewa, May 2012), 
Other landowners mixed such hopes for an effective review with a morc 
pessimistic sense of how negotiations might actually proceed. Tom Kay, 
chairman of Kasua LandowlJer Company, speaking at the public forum on 
permit negotiations noted: 
If we stop the company and the company says I am going I am 
packing up, Whcn the company does this what will happen?, . ,  
Heview must take place this mouth. YOll advise the �-lanager [of 
the PNC Forest Authority] you must fast track [the permit 
review] . . .  before next month [from transcript of the meeting]. 
\\'hen I left the area in mid-May. it was nol clear whether the landowners 
would be in position to ensure the review would result in a radically new 
permit agreement. Compounding the landowners' difficulties. a court case 
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tcsting thc ovcrall Icgality of thc \\Iawoi Cuavi concession. and the use of 
transitional arrangements, was dismissed in June 2012, because the lawyers 
acting for the plaintiffs were not registered. By July 2013. no new lX!nnit 
agreement had been negotiated with operations continuing under the 
indefinite grace period. 
Conclusion 
This paper has shown how the state and a logging company organized time 
in reference to permit renewal. This organization relied on a quite specific 
legal culture defined by the temporal possibilities contained in transitional 
arrangements. Each application of these possibilities to the three specific 
permit renewals considered above was both intensely political and full of 
time saturated arguments. Time emerged as crucial resource available to 
interestcd parties (Rutz 1927, 7; Cocr.!. 2011, l3). Formal legal rules con­
cerning transitional arrangements and grace periods were linked to lX!rmit 
negoti:ltions in ways that hC]IX!d conl1gurc qualities of time into distribu­
tions of power there by highlighting i"'! lInn's point that " control over time 
is not just a strateg), of interaction. it is also a medium of hierarchic power 
and govcrnancc" (1992, 109). 
The law. in failing to expliCitly speciry the duration of transitional relief. 
faCilitated a sitllatiOIl in \Vawoi ellavi wbere transition or legal change 
never clearly occurred. Instead regulation moved away from a notion of it 
limited transition:ll period toward a mode of governance effecth'ely invok­
ing a permanent state of non-transition. By continually taking the parties 
back to an imaginary state prior to the t991 Act. the transitional arrange­
ments operated to efface all the history concerning the social relations of 
production. distribution. and consumption that actually defined much of 
the pcrmit contract during its periods of operation. This clTaciug alienation 
of the concession's real history and its replacement b), the abstract continu­
ity of a pre-1991 legal fiction purified the permit into an apolitical docu­
ment positioned outside or be),ond its real histol)" Although. in practice. 
the effects of recent hist"Ol)' of the concession and the history of p�C's 
broader forestry sector are never fully effaced in the permit conditions. the 
key tendency of the transitional arrangements is to, wherever feasible, 
detemporalize rcecnt history b), placing new conditions within a broader 
politic"l field cnlciall), defined by the permanency of pre-1991 conditions. 
This deternporalizalion-an achievement of repetitious cofJx>rate and 
state policy decisions made over more than twenty )'ears-ma)' not be 
unique to the \\Iawoi Cuavi case. In 2011, arolLnd a third of all PNC's 
forestry concessions (by area) were still regulated b)' timber rights permits 
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derived rrom the legislation repealed by the 1991 Act (PNCFA 2012, 10). 
This suggests that the \\Iawoi euavi case is part of a wider failure of public 
policy 10 rerorm the rorestry sector. 
The \\lawoi Cuavj case study is not just about the failure of transition 
policy but also the production or possible illegalities that tllrt;:aten the legiti­
macy or the resulting decisions. Yet to be tested ill court. the result is not 
a dualistic (:ontrast between the law and its absence. or the clearly distin­
gUishablc presence or both the legal and nonlegal. Bather, what emerged 
were legal ambignities :LS polic)' and political responses rrom within the law 
were articulated into more problematic. potentially illicit. outcomes. As a 
result, the legal and illegal were merged and co-pro<lnetivc (ComaTofT and 
ComarofT2006: Boitman 2006). PNC·s forestry sector is often presented as 
though decisions and the resulting logs ;llId timber cOlild be understood as 
either legal or illegal (Curtin 2006: Australian Covemment 2007). However, 
in this case study, routine administration and regulation or permits and 
timber production did 1101 proceed on the basis of this kiml of clarity. 
Instead. this paper ha..� highlighted how co'l.lOralions and state officials 
successfully exploit the capacity of law to provide a means of escaping full 
regulative control proVided by the law. 
Although judicial clariflcation lI1ay benent the landowners, it is unlikely 
ally stich legal case would bc especially prompt. or would it necessarily 
address all matters associated with transitional processes and permit 
negotiations that are or concern to the landowners. To repeat a llOillt made 
in 2004 by the 200312004 Review Team (2004<1, I Attachment 3), it Illay 
be worth rurther explOring to determine how the remaining transitional 
sections of the Forestry Act could be re\'iewed and redrafted. In the inter­
im, the landowners are still lert waiting at some distance rrom the long 
promised possibilities or legal and policy rerorm. They are no closer to 
efTective permit renewal negotiations than they were prior to 1992. 
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NOTES 
1 .  Follo'\�ng l1.hlllll (199:2) and other.;, talk of tilllc necessarily involves talk of space. 
[n this paper. I dOI\�lpla}' the spatial in an altempt to highlight. rol1ol\�ng Dalsgaard 
(2013. 34). that analysis of the PNC state. and state policies. also demands attention to 
temporality. 
2. In the United States and otller jurisdictions. trnnsitional relief is also knOI\�l as 
'·gr.lndfathering. -
3. Kaplow (1986, 522) argues that gOl'emmen[ COllll:lelisation forchallges in law creates 
possible rents and a culture where the risks of k-gal change can be ignored. HeI)ing on 
Coasc's influential arguments about polluting firms and markets for environmenta! ser­
vices, she thinks gOl'emment inlerl'en[ion is less efficient than :, market-based response 
(KaplowI9S6. 531, fn 53: but see Masur and N:J5h 2010). 
4. An F�·IA is a contract that allows thc state 10 sell the forest Olmer's timber to a 
developer either b)' tender. selective tender. or c.�tension. The earlier legislation repealed 
by the Forestry I\ct 1991 invoked a Timber Rights Purchase (TRP), which invoked far 
fewer procedural TIlles and less concem with t!)�ng to represent hlll{IOII1ICrs rulCl address 
their interests. The differences, if any. betwccn concessions an{1 permits b:J5C(1 on F�I"s 
aud those b:J5C(1 on ·'sal"c<I·' TRPs, ha"e yet [0 be fully anal)�/.ed. 
5. The status of the Kamula Doso was made even more comple.\" dllring the period 
2()()R-IO ... h",,, il "',,( 11 .... , jll(I " f .... ... (I')' ('(>11 ....... (S; .... " s"hj('(>t , .... � 1"�I,\ h,,' "1((1 ,, <'I1rhr.1l 
scheme and a forest clear:lllt-e--road building scheme invoking leasing arrangements 
(Filer and Wood 2012). 
6. 011 the other hand, the reformer.; lila)' hal·e failed sililply to fully appreciate that the 
2002 timber permit contained [he follOWing clausc; ·'6.1 Compliance I\�tli the La\\� The 
Permit Holder shall comply with all rek'"ant law5 of Papua New Cuinc;! and in particular 
the laws regu1a!ing the protection of the ellvirOllrnCll1. tl,e J'NC Logging Code or 
Practice. the J-�orestry Act 1991 and all niles :md regulatiOns and by laws under the 
Forestry Act or all)' other law rf'latillg to forest!)' mailers:' 
7. Messianic hope is a COllimon theme in local histories recor<Ie<! at Kamusi. 
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